SCENARIO
On June 16th, 2019 at approximately 12:30 pm, Yosemite Dispatch received reports from a party on Mammoth Terrace of an accident somewhere high up on the west face of El Capitan. Using scopes from the meadow, rangers spotted a rope hanging through gear above Long Ledge on the Salathé Wall with both climbers sitting on the ledge. Contact was made with the climbers via a helicopter fly-by, during which the climbers indicated that they were the party in need of help.
BACKGROUND
On June 13th, 2019 John Shields and Rylan Knuttgen began the Salathé Wall from Heart Ledges after climbing the Freeblast and prehauling to Heart in the preceding days. Both were experienced multi-pitch climbers with four decades of trad experience between the two of them, including multiple big walls. They had been prepping for the Salathé Wall specifically for the last 18 months and felt physically and mentally prepared for the route.
The climb had gone well when on June 15th, they trended too far right on pitch 26 leading to Sous le Toit from the Block. After encountering tricky aid and loose rock, they realized they were off route and were able to rappel back to the Block, then continue on the correct line. However, this cost them about seven hours and they didn’t arrive at Long Ledge, their planned bivy site, until 4:30am on the 16th.
At 10:30am, they were awake and preparing for the final four pitches of climbing. They had received a weather report the previous day calling for a chance of thunderstorms in the afternoon, and therefore wanted to be off the wall before potential weather arrived. They had also lost cell reception the day before and thus were unable to receive any further weather updates.
At this point they had to decide between the more common aid variation off Long Ledge which heads up a C2 crack on the far right side, and the free variation which goes up steep bolts on the left side. The free variation is given a grade of 5.11d, whereas the climbing above the C2 crack is given a rating of 5.8 in the Supertopo book. However, they also had a topo from MountainProject.com that labeled that portion as “5.10b R polished knobs” and were aware of the notoriety of that variation. When gathering beta for the climb in the Valley beforehand, they had not found anyone who had climbed the left variation, and so were hesitant to go that way. After discussing their options with a team rappelling through Long Ledge who had climbed the original way to the right, they opted to take that variation, with the beta that it is was “heads up, but not terrible”.
Topo from MountainProject.com
Topo from Supertopo
THE ACCIDENT
John opted to take the lead and was feeling good despite their lack of sleep. He began leading around 11:30am with Rylan belaying off the furthest right bolts on Long Ledge (approximately 20 feet from the start of the C2 crack). At the top of the crack John found a fixed grey Fixe Alien Revolution that looked to be in good shape, and so he clipped it as pro (approximately seven pieces of pro had been left in the crack below that). Here available gear placements start to dwindle and then disappear. Above the fixed piece John was able to place a black Alien, but had very little confidence that the piece would hold a fall. At this point John was in free climbing mode and had communicated that to Rylan. He also noted that the piton shown in the Supertopo topo was missing, and let Rylan know that as well. As John continued to climb through the polished knobs he shouted down to Rylan that it would be “a hell of a whipper” if he fell, and as he was readjusting his feet to reach the final jug he slipped.
John leading off of Long Ledge. Photo credit: Rylan Knuttgen
John fell from approximately 12 feet above his last piece, in an arc above Rylan (the pitch at this point had traversed back left). As multiple pieces failed during his fall, his pivot point changed sending him back right to narrowly miss Long Ledge. He ultimately stopped about 20 feet below the ledge, after taking a fall of 50 to 60 feet and hitting the wall multiple times on the way down. John immediately recognized he would need a rescue, but quickly took it upon himself to self-rescue and ascend his line using his jumars and get himself back onto Long Ledge. Attached to his rope was the black Alien (an expected failure), part of the fixed grey Alien which had broken at the stem, and one extra alpine sling which most likely came unclipped from a piece below the grey Alien (either through the carabiner being pulled in such a way that it unclipped or through another gear failure). John was most likely caught by a red #1 Black Diamond C4, which was approximately 20-25 feet below his fall point. After a quick assessment during which they determined John had no head or spine injury, Rylan tried to call 911 multiple times but was unable to get through. Knowing that there were parties below them, they started shouting down the route for someone to call 911, and while the parties immediately below them could not understand what was being said, a party on Mammoth Terrace (nearly 2000 feet below) could hear and called 911.
The exploded alien attached to the rope after John’s fall. Photo credit: Rylan Knuttgen
THE RESCUE
After the team was spotted by using a scope in the meadow, a helicopter was ordered to make further contact. While unable to make verbal contact with the helicpoter, John and Rylan indicated that they needed help by waving. Since both of them were sitting up on the ledge and waving (rather than lying down), rescuers in the helicopter determined that an extremely critical patient was unlikely. YOSAR team members were then flown to the top of El Capitan to launch a “top-down” extrication of the party who were only about 400 feet below the topout. The plan was to send one rescuer down with a litter to package John and raise them back to the top. The rescuer would then be lowered a second time for Rylan and their gear. This was efficiently accomplished but dwindling daylight and the threat of thunderstorms precluded the recovery of the gear placed on the pitch or confirmation of which piece had caught John’s fall. The whole YOSAR team had either hiked off or been flown down before dusk.
John was met by paramedics and YOSAR at the top of the route, then carried up to the summit where he was transported by helicopter to El Capitan meadow. From there he went by ambulance to Fresno and 24 hours later was in surgery. John sustained multiple injuries to the left side of his body including fractured ulna, tibula/fibula, and talus bones.
John and YOSAR team member heading towards the top
Take Extreme Care with Gear Choices – In this case, gear failure was a major factor in turning what might have been a long but reasonably safe fall into a very long and dangerous fall. Always be extremely cautious in the case of fixed gear. A piece you do not know the history of should always be treated with suspicion. There’s a chance that the fixed piece could have been removed to allow for the placement of one of their own pieces given the limited placement options available. It’s also possible that different gear in the same placement as the black Alien would have caught a fall. Especially with small gear, slight variance in size (usually necessitating a different brand of protection) can make a huge difference in the piece’s holding power. When facing a runout above critical pieces, taking the time to be confident of the quality of the gear placements is time well spent.
Fatigue and Time Pressure – Big wall climbing is inherently consuming and the risk of stress and fatigue is very real. After three days on the wall and their late night beforehand, the team was not at their peak climbing shape. They were also feeling the pressure of possible thunderstorms. John and Rylan had enough food and water for extra time on the wall, and a fly for their portaledge to wait out a storm. It’s possible that if they had spent extra time to rest and recover they could have avoided a fall altogether.
Know Your Options – John and Rylan had thoroughly researched their climb by looking at multiple topos and talking to others’ who had been on the route. They were responsive to other climber’s advice and their decision to take the right-hand variation made sense given the information they had gathered. There’s a good chance that had they found a climber who confirmed that the left-hand variation was a safer option and did not require pulling 5.12a moves, they would have gone that way, avoiding the accident potential altogether. While thoroughness in preparation cannot stop every accident, the more knowledge one has about their climb, the less likely they are to be caught off guard in a risky situation.